The check was incorrect, where it was never matching and always
discarding the element. Instead, we should check the owner document,
which is the shadow-including root of the node.
Part of #4577
---------
Signed-off-by: Tim van der Lippe <tvanderlippe@gmail.com>
Also add clarifying comments to the SRI WPT tests with
regards to the `www.` domain and how that interacts with
the integrity checks.
Lastly, adjust the casing for `Strict-Dynamic`, as in
the post-request check that should also be case-insensitive.
Closesservo/servo#37200Closesservo/servo#36760Fixesservo/servo#36499
Part of w3c/webappsec-csp#727Fixesw3c/webappsec-csp#728
Part of servo/servo#4577
Signed-off-by: Josh Matthews <josh@joshmatthews.net>
Signed-off-by: Tim van der Lippe <tvanderlippe@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Josh Matthews <josh@joshmatthews.net>
All logic is implemented in `report_csp_violations` to avoid
pulling in various element-logic into SecurityManager.
Update the `icon-blocked.sub.html` WPT test to ensure that
the document is the correct target (verified in Firefox and Chrome).
Fixes#36806
Signed-off-by: Tim van der Lippe <tvanderlippe@gmail.com>
Also update a WPT test to fail-fast if the iframe incorrectly
evaluates the `eval`. Before, it would run into a timeout if
the implementation is correct. Now we reject the promise
when an exception is thrown.
Requires servo/rust-content-security-policy#6
Signed-off-by: Tim van der Lippe <tvanderlippe@gmail.com>
This turned out to be a full rabbit hole. The new header
is parsed in the new `parse_csp_list_from_metadata` which
sets `disposition` to `report.
I was testing this with
`script-src-report-only-policy-works-with-external-hash-policy.html`
which was blocking the script incorrectly. Turns out that there
were multiple bugs in the CSP library, as well as a missing
check in `fetch` to report violations.
Additionally, in several locations we were manually reporting csp
violations, instead of the new `global.report_csp_violations`. As
a result of that, they would double report, since the report-only
header would be appended as a policy and now would report twice.
Now, all callsides use `global.report_csp_violations`. As a nice
side-effect, I added the code to set source file information,
since that was already present for the `eval` check, but nowhere
else.
Part of #36437
Requires servo/rust-content-security-policy#5
---------
Signed-off-by: Tim van der Lippe <tvanderlippe@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim van der Lippe <TimvdLippe@users.noreply.github.com>
This makes sure that when workers are created, their global scope has
the correct policy-container set
so that we can do CSP-checks.
Signed-off-by: Tim van der Lippe <tvanderlippe@gmail.com>
This also ensures that document now reports all violations and we set
the correct directive.
With these changes, all `script-src-attr-elem` WPT tests pass.
Part of #36437
Requires servo/rust-content-security-policy#3 to land first
Signed-off-by: Tim van der Lippe <tvanderlippe@gmail.com>
It also updates the FetchResponseListener to process CSP violations to
ensure that iframe elements (amongst others) properly generate the CSP
events. These iframe elements are used in the Trusted Types tests
themselves and weren't propagating the violations before.
However, the tests themselves are still not passing since they also use
Websockets, which currently aren't using the fetch machinery itself.
That is fixed as part of [1].
[1]: https://github.com/servo/servo/issues/35028
---------
Signed-off-by: Tim van der Lippe <tvanderlippe@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Matthews <josh@joshmatthews.net>
Co-authored-by: Josh Matthews <josh@joshmatthews.net>
This will establish a baseline for the changes from #36363.
Testing: New tests in CI.
Fixes: Part of #4577
Signed-off-by: Josh Matthews <josh@joshmatthews.net>
